2007. An Institutional Theory Of Sanctions Onse... May 2026

Democracies are more frequent senders and tend to target those most vulnerable to economic pressure.

: Senders are more likely to initiate sanctions against states where they believe the political institutions will make the sanctions effective. 2007. An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onse...

Autocratic leaders benefit from the scarcity created by sanctions to reward loyalists. Democracies are more frequent senders and tend to

Beyond success rates, the paper explores why certain states are targeted in the first place: Beyond success rates, the paper explores why certain

: In democracies, leaders rely on a large coalition. Economic pain felt by the broader public directly threatens the leader's support base, making them more likely to concede.

: The authors suggest that majoritarian democratic politics may "overproduce" sanctions as a policy tool due to domestic demands from various interest groups within their own large winning coalitions. Summary of Hypotheses Institutional Effect Sanction Success

The full study is available via SAGE Journals or ResearchGate . Journal of Conflict Resolution - Florida State University